

NOTE ON IPDC IN LATIN AMERICA:
STATUS AND PROSPECTS

Luis Ramiro Beltrán
Regional Adviser in Communication
for Latin America

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I N D E X

	Page
I. NATURE OF PROJECTS	1
II. PROJECT'S PERFORMANCE	4
III. EXPLAINING ILL PERFORMANCE	13
IV. IMAGE PROMOTION?	19
V. ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS	20
VI. FUTURE POSSIBILITIES	25
ANNEXES	
A. Extra-budgetary projects handled by RCA/LA between 1983 and 1990	i
B. Summary of products of extra-budgetary projects handled by RCA/LA between 1983 and 1990	vii
C. The project monitoring system built at RCA/LA	xiii

I. NATURE OF PROJECTS

1. Between 1983 and 1990 the Office of the Regional Adviser for Communication in Latin America (RCA/LA) has handled a total of 37 IPDC projects totaling US\$1,304,000.* The distribution by years was the following:

YEAR	NUMBER		AMOUNT US\$	
1983	1 project	2.7	15,000	1.2
1984	3 projects	8.1	180,000	13.8
1985	1 project	2.7	100,000	7.7
1986	8 projects	16.2	205,000	15.7
1987	11 projects	29.8	245,000	18.8
1988	7 projects	18.9	179,000	13.7
1989	3 projects	8.1	129,000	9.9
1990	5 projects	13.5	251,000	19.2

2. The amount expected by proponents for these projects was far higher than that approved: US\$2,874,617. The sum granted represented less than half the one requested: 45.4 per cent.

3. Of the total of 37 projects 30 (81 per cent) were originated by this regional office and 7 (19 per cent) by headquarters.

4. Although IPDC started funding projects in 1982 RCA/LA had only five projects up to 1985 (13.5 per cent) for a total of US\$295,000, representing just 22.7 per cent of the total sum granted to the 37 projects for the eight-year period under review. This was

*Another three were also transferred to this office late in 1984 but, on request from it, had to be recentralized in 1985.

low considering that in the initial years of the Program there were more funds available than requests for support.

5. Instead, just in the first year in which a new Regional Adviser* became able to foster IPDC projects, 1986, the number of them was not only matched but surpassed by one the figure for the previous three-year period: six, representing 16.2 per cent of the total number of projects and 15.7 per cent of the total amount granted to them in the period.

6. Furthermore, in the next year, 1987, the number of projects raised to 11, almost the double of the previous year. However, since by then IPDC funds had not increased, the total amount was only of US\$245,000 and came to represent just 18.8 per cent of the total grant for the eight-year period. Nevertheless, the five-year period between 1986 and 1990 accounted as a whole for 86.5 per cent of the number of projects and amounted to 77.3 per cent of the total money granted to them.

7. The increase in demands for IPDC support to projects not coupled with increase in IPDC funds determined a significant decrease, as of the middle of the decade, in the average rate of allotment per project. This went down from US\$60,000 in 1984 to US\$33,000 in 1986 and to US\$25,000 in 1988.


8. The average total allotment per year to RCA/LA for IPDC projects has been, along 1983-1990, of barely little more than US\$160,000.

*L. R. Beltrán took the Quito post in Summer 1984 from an acting consultant, but then it was too late for him to propose projects for approval in 1985.

9. The following is a distribution of the total of projects following several basic criteria:


Geographical Scope

- National	24	=	64.9%
- Regional	12	=	32.4%
- Inter-regional	<u>1</u>	=	<u>2.7%</u>
TOTAL	37	=	100.0%




Type of Beneficiary

- Non-governmental organizations	21	=	56.8%
- Government agencies	14	=	37.8%
- International public organizations	<u>2</u>	=	<u>5.4%</u>
TOTAL	37	=	100.0%



Functions


- Training	13	=	35.1%
- Institutional strengthening*	7	=	19.0%
- Equipping	6	=	16.2%
- Research	4	=	10.8%
- Production	<u>2</u>	=	<u>5.4%</u>
TOTAL	37	=	100.0%



*This embraces technical assistance for improving institutional policies and plans as well as management. It also includes exchange and promotion operations geared towards building operational infrastructures.

Media Involved

- Multi-media	11	=	29.7%
- Television	7	=	19.0%
- Video	6	=	16.2%
- Radio	5	=	13.5%
- Generical*	5	=	13.5%
- Film	2	=	5.4%
- Press	1	=	2.7%
TOTAL	37		100.0%



10. At the time of the present report, out of the 37 projects handled by RCA/LA 24 have been terminated (64.9 per cent), 8 are in process of implementation (21.6 per cent), and 5 are about to be initiated (13.5 per cent). (See status listing in Annex A.)

II. PROJECTS' PERFORMANCE

Each IPDC project is built around a statement of objectives, of which the specific ones are more useful for assessing performance than the general ones. In principle we deem a project "successful" if it has attained, or is attaining, its specific objectives, and "unsuccessful" if it fails to attain those objectives or if it falls clearly short of doing so.

Which are the criteria for assessing goal attainment? Those in use by us at present are implementation rate and completion time. Implementation rate is the degree to which a project has, in visible practice, performed its activities in a manner instrumental to attaining its stated objectives. Completion time is the number of months

*It is equivalent to a non-media category since it refers to projects going beyond any unit or combination of media.

taken by the project to achieve termination. In principle, if the implementation rate is high and the completion time is low, the project could be deemed a "success"; instead, if the rate is low and the time is high, the project could be regarded a "failure."

The obvious indicators for appraising the implementation rate are activity performance and product delivery. (The related disbursement level is, of course, a concomitant clue, but by itself is not an adequate and sufficient indicator of project development.) Through the grantee's reports to us and, at times, also through inspection by ourselves, we verify whether the activities planned have been accomplished or not. And performance is made evident by the provision of products; such is the case, for instance, of a workshop that yields a given number of trained people or of a set of research findings that are published in a book. To measure completion time we simply compare intended length of the project, as stated in approved proposal, contract or workplan, and the time effectively spent, as recorded in the reports.

Assuming that we verify in our projects satisfactory implementation rate and reasonable completion time, does this really make them truly successful? The RCA/LA experience suggests a negative answer. Those two variables seem necessary in the case but not sufficient. Thus, a closer look at "success" seems in order.

"Success" is directly related to "effectiveness"; that is to say, to achieving desired effects or accomplishing intended goals. Many projects tend to be "effective," but... at which price? If they secure their impact at a high cost in time, effort, and resources they

may be effective indeed but not desirable. Effectiveness is not equal to efficiency. Efficiency is effectiveness divided by cost. It is attained when a project gains a maximum impact with a minimum investment, when a moderate input leads to an excellent output. Or, at least, when these are directly proportional to each other. By adding this key concept to our gauging arsenal we can be more cautious and rigorous in assessing the success or failure of the projects we handle. Measuring efficiency is more difficult than sizing-up effectiveness, but, if at all possible in our present conditions of work, it is certainly desirable.

Two other considerations appear also pertinent in appraising the IPDC projects: process quality and product quality. Process quality refers to the manner in which the project is conducted by the grantee both technically and managerially. Is it well planned and closely monitored or is it rather loose and improvised? Is excellence pursued or mediocrity tolerated? Is discipline added to intelligence in running operations or is lack of organization acting to dilute the technical merits of the activities? Are accounts kept neatly and documents handled orderly? Product quality refers to the nature of the project's outputs. Is the research undertaken justified and reliable? Will the graduates of courses be able to do more than temporarily remembering some data? Is that script really well thought out and that video made to actually fit an educational need and not just to satisfy esthetical considerations? Does it make sense to print many publications for a target audience in which illiterates are not the minority? Should such expenditure in equipment be made in the

absence of a policy and its derived strategies? Is this pilot actually replicable elsewhere? Is that beautiful book really what was most needed by that people at such point in time? Questions as these are rarely even poised in our daily work. The lack of time and the excess of work and travel seem to be pushing sometimes field workers to seek securing termination... regardless of quality. And headquarters staff, in turn, hardly has a chance to require more than heterogeneous termination reports and un-evaluated products. And so we often rush to "close the files..."

In the light of considerations as these, how do the IPDC projects handled by RCA/LA fare?

First, let us just apply the simple notion of "success"/"failure." The majority of these 1983-1990 projects can be deemed successful inasmuch as having accomplished their professed goals. Only three of them had their files closed without having completed a few actions in the end and thus had to reimburse to headquarters small amounts of unspent moneys. And another four of them suffered from very serious shortcomings and were extremely slow in achieving termination. Altogether these seven projects had shortfalls but were not failures as they did complete--even if with difficulties and delays--most of their workplans. This is to say that a clear majority of the projects had a good implementation rate.

However, which was, as a rule, the completion time in the case of the projects assessed? The answer is provided by comparing intended time with effective time and so obtaining the difference that equals delay time.

Intended time was computed for a net total of 32 of the 37 projects after deleting those 5 which have still not started operations. The average obtained was of 9.8 months.

Effective time was computed for a net total of 24 projects because, in addition to discounting the 5 not started yet, it seemed logical to exclude also 8 which were still in execution having no firm assurance of terminal date. The resulting average was of 23.1 months.

Delay time was computed for 28 projects, discounting the non-started 4, an unusual 1 finished without delay, and 3 which are still in process but have not fallen into delay. The average was 12.8.

In summary and simplifying the figures for facility of analysis, it can be said that, on the average, the projects intended to last about 12 months but took in practice some 24, thus implying a 12-month delay. For implementation to take twice much time as foreseen is by itself an indication of poor planning and a bad mark of performance. But the situation is actually worse if the 12.8 average is set aside because it was computed between extreme poles: from 1 to 36 months of delay! In fact, a closer look at the data shows that 12 of the 28 projects, close to one half of the total, actually had delays running from 13 to 36 months. Within this bracket the worst cases were those projects which suffered delays ranging between 30 and 36 months: three national and one regional.

Delay in intended implementation time may be deemed reasonable if it does not go over 25 per cent or, in exceptional cases, up to a 33 per cent. Beyond these limits projects tend to fall into a situation of inefficiency because their costs exceed their benefits. And the

more the delay the more the inefficiency, of course. All IPDC projects under analysis fall clearly into such undesirable situation. By at least doubling their intended time they increase much their operational costs: the staff keeps earning salaries without producing results and equipment/materials may have their prices raised above the original level budgeted. Likewise, the ill execution of at least part of the activities foreseen can be harmful and frustrate the expectations of the destinataries of the endeavour. All this detracts from IPDC contribution and heavily castigates the counterpart contribution.

What about the UNESCO contribution? Excluding that corresponding to headquarters the RCA/LA costs alone are quite considerable though not always very visible. The overall yearly budget of this office --not counting the funds in GIPO to support activities--amounts, approximately, to US\$134,000 (88,000 in gross salaries of international regular staff, two employees, and 46,000 in indirect costs). This cost is mostly attributable to IPDC because its projects are more numerous, longer, and much more demanding of technical and managerial support than those of the Regular Program. Thus, it can be safely assumed that at least 60 per cent of the cost is caused by IPDC projects. This means US\$80,000 out of the yearly US\$134,000. Given that the yearly average of IPDC project budget handled by RCA/LA is US\$160,000 for every project dollar spent by IPDC, UNESCO (RCA/LA) spent half a dollar.* However, since the average duration of those

*Logical and useful as it has been in spite of its smallness, the IPDC subsidy to RCA/LA's indirect costs, it has fallen clearly short of requirements; granted only between 1986 and 1989 this subsidy totaled US\$45,000 for the period. No subsidy was given for 1990.

projects (in great contrast with the Regular Program ones) is of two years, then in the end it can be said that for each IPDC dollar UNESCO has actually had to put another dollar. This obviously increases much the overall real cost, which regrettably renders inefficient the IPDC operations.

Meanwhile, granted that efficiency is a better measure of a project's performance than simple effectiveness, let us acknowledge the fact that we presently have no way in UNESCO to attempt gauging the former. This would require, to mention just a couple of elements, scientific parameters to measure objectively pre-post intervention differences and input-output ratio tables applicable to a variety of circumstances.

Is there anything we can do in the absence of such a sophisticated evaluation tool? Yes, we probably can devise simple manners to appraise process quality and product quality. We would not claim them objective, of course, but could somehow make them better than simple hunch or sheer prejudice. To be so they would have to be made systematic and hopefully applicable by anyone any place. Precise planning and strict monitoring can make possible this modest but practical approach to the problem.

Anticipating such possibility leads us to venturing to "assess" process and product quality in the projects handled by this office, more as a whole than unit by unit. After careful review of each project's records our overall impression is that they may, on the average, be rather low in process quality and yet relatively high in product quality. This is to say that, although their implementation

was usually very slow and suffered from serious administrative deficiencies, their productivity tended to rescue--or redeem?--the projects in the end. The following table, by itself expressive of effective performance, quantifies in summary said productivity. (See detailed listing in Annex B.)

IPDC PRODUCT CONTROL TABLE: 1983-1990 SUMMARY

TYPE OF PRODUCT	QUANTITY
Training activities (courses, seminars, workshops, meetings, study tours)	100 training sessions for 3,164 trainees: 1,749 men and 1,415 women
Publications (books, brochures, bulletins, manuals, catalogues, etc.)	92
Reports (studies, advisory reports, methodological designs)	57
Audio-cassettes (radio programs and others)	46
Films recovered for restoration	272
Videos (for group viewing and TV broadcast)	4
Scripts for radio and TV	105
Provision of equipment	15

What about the quality of these products? It has already been noted that there is no present capability in UNESCO to objectively judge and rate product quality. Subjective, but hopefully dispassionate, judgement would suggest that, on the average, the products are of a satisfactory quality. This we can figure out by comparing them with other similar products, by recording reactions from users of our projects' products, and by examining the degree of fitness of products with the project's intents and ultimate beneficiaries.

Is such positive impression equatable with the verification of efficiency? In principle, it could be. Paradoxically perhaps, however, we tend in the case to venture the negative hypothesis: most IPDC projects handled so far by RCA/LA are likely to have been low in efficiency as they tended to attain effectiveness at too high a price in time and effort.

Summing up these concepts we propose that project success as judged by effectiveness or goal attainment is an insufficient measure that can be improved much by gauging efficiency and suggest that process and product quality can be improved through proper planning and monitoring as well as by subjective but systematic and sensible appraisal. Furthermore, we argue that, while most IPDC projects handled by RCA/LA can be deemed effective--and their products be rated satisfactory--they may not be regarded, as a rule, also efficient.

III. EXPLAINING ILL PERFORMANCE

Who is to blame for the inefficiency detected? Exactly which may be the factors generating the unsatisfactory implementation of projects? A check run at their files in RCA/LA brought out nine principal reasons. A frequency count then yielded 51 mentions of those reasons for a net total of 28 projects, excluding the 5 not started, 3 in process without delay and 1 finished also on time. The distribution of the mentions among the reasons resulted as follows:

1. Excessive, often undesirable and sometimes unauthorized, changes in program and budget	16
2. Chronical slowness in report submission	9
3. Other faulty management practices (disregarding contract's terms; incurring in non-agreed expenses; not conducting planned activities while conducting unplanned ones; lack of coordination between top authorizing officer, project manager, and financial officer, as well as between project leader and staff members/consultants/sub-contractors; delegation of duties to uninformed or incompetent deputies; and negligence in building appropriate equipment list and obtaining proformas for purchasing them)	6
4. Frequent substitution of staff responsible for projects usually without provision of orientation and documents to secure continuity	6
5. Political violence impairing the functioning of public administration (strikes, terrorism, stage of siege and guerrilla warfare)	3
6. Postal service deficiencies	2
7. Extreme slowness in placing centralized purchase orders for equipment	4
8. Slowness in approving pro-formas for local purchases of equipment	3
9. Slowness in shipping and delivering equipment purchases	2

The number of mentions, 37, for the first four reasons identified accounts for 72.6 per cent of the total 51 and points out to faults of the grantees of projects. With five mentions, reasons 5 and 6 account for 9.8 per cent and refer to factors beyond the control of grantee institutions or of UNESCO. Instead, the balance of nine reasons --numbers 7, 8, and 9--accounts for 17.6 per cent and corresponds to UNESCO and/or to its equipment suppliers. Evidently and logically, the bulk of the responsibility for ill project performance lied with the grantee institutions themselves. The UNESCO share of the blame appears relatively moderate in number of projects affected: six. However, its delay in processing equipment purchases had strong negative consequences on implementation because PEC's negligence, redtape and errors contributed to slowing them down for periods going from 7 to 33 months, this latter being three times the expected standard duration of IPDC projects. Political violence was a major hindrance only in two or three cases and even then it was not the only explanation for long delays but rather a factor added to mismanagement by grantee or by UNESCO. And mail problems had only little influence.

The problems above identified substantiate our notion that, although the projects' review can be regarded effective, they cannot be regarded efficient. Furthermore, it is apparent that the chief reason for it is not professional incompetence, since product quality is in general good and sometimes even excellent. The main explanation for inefficiency is poor management, an acute and generalized lack of administrative skills to properly conduct project implementation.

Poor management does not refer only to the implementation stage. It begins with inadequate planning at the point of inception: the writing of the proposal itself... if not before. Indeed, often the first problem lies in the fact that the proponent has really no adequate institutional capability to aspire to IPDC support. Another early-born problem is the lack of true commitment among institutional executives to secure continuity beyond IPDC's support or even a real counterpart contribution. Expecting from field offices that they ascertain capability and commitment for continuity at the time of the Secretariat's comments is touching on these key questions already late in the game. From these initial problems result some prodocs affected by a marked disparity between goals and resources, between ambitious intentions and effective capabilities. Usually clouded by a rhetoric of vague formulation of numerous long-term ideals (most often unattainable), the specific objectives are often imprecise or incomplete and at times show insufficient consistency with the preliminary program of activities or workplan. And yet not a few of such proposals manage somehow to win the approval of the Council.

The next problem in the area of planning comes at the launching point. Contracts having to be very succinct to fit the forms obviously do not allow room for securing elaboration and refinement of the operational plans sketched out in the approved proposal. Thus, we have to demand from grantees to provide us, for attachment to the contract and as a condition for making the initial payment, a "Program-Budget." Although at RCA/LA we give them some guidance for it, unfortunately we do not count yet on a sharp guide or demonstration

models. Thus, we normally have to accept less satisfactory submissions in order not to delay further the launching of operations. Attached to them come calendars. These basic documents--revised program, adjusted budget, and tentative calendar--are indispensable instruments for project monitoring and, eventually, evaluation. They have become, since the middle of this decade, more necessary than ever in view of the growing disparity between funds requested and those approved. An applicant that asked for X and obtained only Z must of necessity modify its program, reshape its budget, and revise its calendar before engaging into action.

This takes time and often needs assistance from us. But more time is consumed, and delay is caused, in awaiting for assurance of availability of funds to be able to sign contracts. Even before, just notifying approval from headquarters to grantees tends to take one or two months after the Council's meeting. And from approval notification to notice of effective funding another two-four months may easily elapse. Finally, from notice of funding to contract's signature --taking into account our logical demand for reformulation and adjustment--from one to three months more may be inevitable. This means that out of the 12-month standard delay in project execution some 6 months, if not more, are determined by IPDC-UNESCO, not by the grantees.

Once the project starts its development monitoring must begin. On given dates given reports should be submitted, but here comes one of the major causes for grantee's delays: its inability to timely and properly write technical reports, be them of progress or final, allied with its incompetence to secure proper accounting of expenditures and

write adequate financial reports. UNESCO takes part of the blame for this problem too because so far it has not designed, tested, and distributed standard reporting models and formats fitting the diverse characteristics of projects.

By monitoring should not be understood one-lump data collection for semestral reviews or yearly overall reports. It should be understood, rather, as very frequent and continuous tasks of systematically recording in proper files key data on each of the events--foreseen and performed--of a project's development, from inception to termination. The first use of such data is not formal assessment or rigorous evaluation, judgemental operations that come later; it is enabling program officers to readily exert prodding so as to try and make sure that the grantee does timely comply with the agreement and meets his goals and programs within its authorized calendar and budget. Without such a close surveillance of the implementation process, periodical or occasional, assessments may not only be ill documented but meet with undesirable finding too late to seek correction. And, of course, reliable evaluation could hardly be possible in the end.

Proper monitoring is more easy to recommend than to build and it is not inexpensive to run. But is clearly worth every minute and dollar put into it. In the absence of an effective universal system for it and pressed by the challenge of coping with a very large number of IPDC projects decentralized to its jurisdiction, RCA/LA had to establish--in addition to project inspection through field missions--a monitoring system of its own. Of course, it built it, nonetheless, under the overall institutional framework. Manual at the beginning,

by the middle of 1985, and now computerized, the system has been fully operative since the middle of 1987. It is a simple one based on an open filing system for projects--also designed by the RCA/LA in 1985--and run on a half-time basis by a highly trained and competent operator, involving probably a third of the time of the RCA/LA himself at the analytical level.

Far from perfect or complete but evidently efficacious, the system has allowed this office to keep a tight surveillance over implementation of all activities--Regular Programme or Extra-Budgetary--and to be able to inform about project status at any time with considerable speed, depth, and reliability.

Attached as Annex C to this paper the reader will find a short non-technical description of the RCA/LA monitoring system. A draft technical manual for operating it was sent in June of this year to DDG/PBE on its request, with copy to the Sector.

Designing, testing, running, and adjusting the system was possible, in part, through recourse to some fraction of an IPDC operational subsidy granted to this office since 1986. Started in that year with US\$5,000 had to be raised in 1987-1988 to US\$10,000 and reached in 1989 US\$20,000. For 1990, however, no IPDC subsidy has been granted to RCA/LA and this, in addition to impeding the refinement and expansion of the system, may even get to affect somewhat its very maintenance. Obviously, without this tool it would simply be impossible to keep a tight check on the projects as is done today.

IV: IMAGE PROMOTION?

As far as this office can ascertain, the IPDC is hardly known at all in the region, except in the cases of a few officers of beneficiary institutions and some international experts vinculated with UNESCO. That is to say that the public in general, or even the governments in particular, have probably never heard of the program. Thus, there can hardly be among the public perceptions, positive or negative.

We should keep in mind that, given the vast diversity and the great complexity of the international system for technical and financial assistance and its remoteness from the population, people in general could barely distinguish the UN system from the others or identify UNESCO as very different from UNICEF or FAO. Therefore, it would seem unrealistic to further expect that they discriminate within UNESCO among its three main programs and that they may even understand the relationships among them.

UNESCO has in OPI a system for international public information that is responsible for publicizing all of its chief activities regardless of which program each may belong to. Can we expect this system to help establish for IPDC a separate identity before the public by stressing attention on the operations of this particular program in Latin America? This should certainly be possible, especially if IPDC money would get to bolster OPI. Would it, however, be really necessary? Presumably, there can be two main practical reasons to broadly and intensely advertise IPDC: to look for new donors and to

invite additional requests for support. It is very dubious that the former purpose would be well served through the mass media approach and, as for the latter, could we possibly seek to increase a demand which--given the small funds of the program--we already cannot cope well with? Or are there other goals in the endeavour of especially publicizing IPDC? Perhaps we should show the program's productivity to present donors? Whatever the case, should such publicity prove indeed necessary and convenient, it would be for OPI to do the job since offices as that of the RCA/LA--unipersonal and underbudgeted--would find extremely hard to dully undertake such added responsibility.

V. ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS

Is IPDC catering to verified, universal, and pressing needs of Latin America today or is it just giving support to an assortment of individual demands not responding to concerted priorities or fitting into a systemic approach? Unfortunately, the latter may rather be the case. However, to be sure of it and act accordingly, perhaps IPDC itself should foster soon some region-wide research and have a forum of experts define needs in detail and redefine priorities in the light of the imminent XXI Century.

Meanwhile, we can tentatively identify major needs in two inter-related areas that fall in the domain of IPDC and UNESCO: communication development and development communication. Given the space and time constraints determined by the agenda, we will enumerate each of these needs but have no opportunity for discussing them in this paper.

The mandate of IPDC explicitly centers on helping the "Third World" countries develop their communication capabilities so as to reduce the prevailing imbalance of resources in comparison with the nations of the developed world. The heart of its operational strategy is made of training for increasing and improving the endogenous production of messages. This is a sound priority but it should probably not be overemphasized at the expense of other priorities. For instance:

1. Assisting the countries in formulating and applying policies, strategies, plans, and programs, as well as in building mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating communication endeavours.
2. Improving management systems and practices so as to secure efficiency in the performance of communication agencies.
3. Helping build and refine public and private non-profit structures, such as community radio or State television devoted to educational and cultural (not propagandistic) concerns.
4. Supporting the evolution of research and training institutions, public or private, national and regional.
5. Fostering regional integrative exercises of exchange and cooperation in all areas of communication.

IPDC has provided some assistance in Latin America to projects falling into most of the items listed above, all pertaining to the domain of communication development. (A very notorious exemption would be the area of management improvement.) However, as even cursory inspection of project documentation shows, the Program has not placed emphasis in any of these key areas. This is regrettable because they all lead to institution building for eventual self-sufficiency.

Another set of priority areas of communication development in this region is made of the following:

1. Systematic assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of new communication technologies in the domain of "teletronics"
2. Helping modernization of media infrastructures through sensible and selective application of computerized technologies.
3. Fostering expansion and improvement of alternative communication formats that help provide grass-roots organizations with access to and participation in the communication processes of their societies.
4. Facilitating the emergency of a new journalism characterized by social sensitivity, educational and cultural vocation, and in-depth reporting beyond the epidermical treatment of daily news and keen to the needs of majorities.
5. Strengthening on-going efforts to give ample diffusion and application of media education methodologies devised and tested by a number of qualified experts and excellence centers in this region.

IPDC so far has not provided assistance in the region to projects in areas 1, 4 and 5. It has provided it in areas 2 and 3 but only in the case of a few projects and, thus, not as a priority.

The next set of needs fall in the domain of development communication; that is, communication in the service of economic growth, social progress, and material advancement. IPDC is also committed to sponsoring work in this area. Some of the chief needs within it are these:

1. Communication in the service of health for all, the avowed goal for year 2000, which is unattainable without organized and efficient public communication systems.
2. Communication supporting improvement of mother and child health, especially in rural areas, a paramount development goal in many countries of the region, also unattainable without effective communication.

3. Communication in the service of education for all by year 2000, another action universally agreed, especially in literacy training and adult distance non-formal education, as well as in primary schooling.
4. Communication as an instrument for fighting drug traffic and consumption, especially among the youth, as well as for helping prevent the spread of grave ailments as SIDA.
5. Communication as an instrument to help reduce birth rates so as to check the rapid population growth that is contributing to aggravate the underdevelopment situation.
6. Communication to promote rational use of the resources and protection of the environment.
7. Communication as an agent to foster tolerance and voluntary integration of diverse ethnias and cultures into a coherent and solid national socio-cultural system.
8. Communication in support of efforts to consolidation of democratic forms of government, along with democratizing the communication system and allied with efforts in favor of peace, non-violence, and respect for human rights.
9. Communication to bolster the women's struggle in search for egalitarianism.
10. And communication in relation to social problems derived from foreign debt, and the extremely grave economic situation prevailing in the region since the outset of the 1980 decade.

Each of the communication needs just enumerated correspond directly to the most pressing problems presently afflicting the Latin Americans. Since the early 80's underdevelopment has become gravely accentuated in many respects and has determined high levels of social combustivity, delinquency, and political violence in many countries of the region. Devastating inflation afflicts several of them and in most while salaries have greatly deteriorated income has kept very low whereas prices have jumped beyond control. Unemployment has become generalized and acute. Income distribution shows further concentration, indicating that the gap between the few rich and the many poor

is dangerously broadening instead of getting reduced. Health standards have not been ameliorated and child mortality is high and still unchecked. Educational standards have considerably diminished instead of expanding. Meanwhile, population is still growing at a high rate incompatible with that of food production. Resource mismanagement by irrational industrialization, elimination of animal species, and environmental destruction seem hardly controllable and pollution has reached alarming levels in some countries. Clandestine production and exportation of toxic drugs as cocaine has so far defeated most efforts to control it by repression and consumption of narcotics by young people is on the increase. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and common delinquency have reached astonishing levels in a few countries, paralyzing State operation, impairing private business, and taking thousands of lives. Human rights are often violated without punishment, journalists are frequently killed, and women still are not granted full equality with men. National unity is at times threatened in a few cases by territorial fractionalism and interethnic strike. And a monumental foreign debt, which demands extremely high levels of exports' income to be applied to its service has sent the region's development levels back to pre-1970 standards in many cases. Clearly more than a third of the population struggles to survive enduring levels of "critical poverty," an euphemism for outright misery. In the middle of the turmoil caused by such dreadful coincidence of negative factors the Latin Americans have nonetheless managed to restore democratic rule bringing down in the process even the strongest and oldest bastions of authoritarianism.

Hardly any of these so grave underdevelopment problems afflicting today many millions of Latin Americans can be solved without counting on the people's commitment and active involvement. And this cannot be secured without the assistance of communication. Would it, therefore, not be logical that IPDC gets to support communication work clearly related to these serious concerns? Assuming an affirmative answer, which should have a higher priority: communication development or development communication? Or should there be a total concentration of the meager funds on just one of these two areas? These would seem today crucial questions for IPDC and for UNESCO.

VI: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

It seems hardly possible to attain an "impact" or expect an "image" for a program spending as little as US\$160,000 per year for a whole region with some 20 countries with a population approaching 500 million people. By the same token significant possibilities for the future may only be considered, in the case of Latin America, if the assumption is made that the annual rate for the 1991 decade may be raised at least five times so as to reach US\$800,000 as the minimum level for securing "critical mass."

Making that assumption, however, is evidently not realistic since there is no indication at all that the IPDC funds may substantially increase in the foreseeable future. What, then, are the alternatives? One is, of course, resignation with the present very low level. Another, generous and courageous, would be for Latin Americans to cease

forming a part of the body of beneficiaries so as to let its share of the budget go to strengthen that of the other Third World countries. And a third option could be to concentrate the small annual grant exclusively in favor of regional projects characterized by a high multiplying potential.

Let us briefly give some additional attention to the latter possibility and attempt to combine it with other priority considerations. Latin America has a set of communication institutions of region-wide scope spread across its geography:

- Instituto Latinoamericano de Comunicación Educativa (ILCE) Mexico
- Agencia ALASEI Mexico
- Federación Latinoamericana de Periodistas (FELAP) Mexico
- Escuela Internacional de Cine y Televisión Cuba
- Unión Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Radiodifusión (ULCRA) Costa Rica
- Federación Latinoamericana de Trabajadores de Prensa (FELATRAP) Venezuela
- Acción de Sistemas Informativos Nacionales (ASIN) Venezuela
- Federación Latinoamericana de Facultades de Comunicación Social (FELAFACS) Colombia
- Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores en Comunicación para América Latina (CIESPAL) Ecuador
- Asociación Latinoamericana de Educación Radiofónica (ALER) Ecuador
- Unión Católica Latinoamericana de Prensa (UCLAP) Ecuador

- Unión Católica Latinoamericana de Radio y Televisión (UNDA-AL) Ecuador
- Oficina del Cine Internacional Católico (OCIC) Ecuador
- Instituto para América Latina (IPAL) Perú
- Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (ILET) Chile
- Asociación Latinoamericana de Investigación en Comunicación (ALAIC) Brasil
- Federación Latinoamericana de Distribuidores de Video Alternativo Brasil

Given that the non-concentrated approach results in an inconvenient dispersion of the very limited funds available it might prove more fruitful to grant them to only one or two of those regional institutions every year. Each of them do reach numerous people in many countries of the region and, by being bolstered with IPDC funds, can improve at least some of their services to take care of multi-nation requirements.

Moreover, IPDC would, in the process, contribute to institution building with an eye on helping attain self-sufficiency.

➤ However, ~~for~~ those regional institutions being close to 20 money still would not be enough to help all of them and in every respect. Thus, the geographical priority could be combined with other priorities leading to non-arbitrary reductions. For instance, in terms of functions institutional building and training could be preferred. In terms of media the audio-visual ones--movies, television, and video--might be privileged. And, in terms of type of beneficiary, the non-governmental agencies would be automatically prioritized as there is

only a couple of regional organizations financed by governments. Furthermore, in terms of needs priorities can go to development communication projects and, within this category, to projects emphasizing communication for health, for education, for environmental protection, and for population control. Communication development would not be neglected but emphasis would go to policies/plans, management, exchange, and new technologies. By organizing some such a combination of priorities funds at present level of donations may be more profitably used and, if ever expanded, become easily optimized by following a policy derived from priority selection.

If some such a systematization was acceptable it would probably also call for a re-arrangement of the decision-making mechanism for project planning, funding, and evaluation. One way to simplify it and reduce its presently sizeable cost could be perhaps to consider substituting the ^{VOI}most large council with a slightly expanded bureau that would absorb ^{OF}most the roles of both. A yearly regional meeting like the present one would help the new body process the proposals to the point of decision-making. Each regional office would be strengthened with an assistant adviser (in charge of planning, monitoring, and evaluation) and endowed with adequate funds for travel, communication, and temporary assistance.

Are such changes in fact desirable and feasible? Perhaps this meeting would be in a position to provide the answers.

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A N N E X E S

EXTRA-BUDGETARY PROJECTS HANDLED BY RCA/LA BETWEEN 1983 AND 1990*

A. IPDC PROJECTS

CODE	PROJECT TITLE AND GRANTEE INSTITUTION	AMOUNT US\$	APPROVAL YEAR	STATUS
I N T E R R E G I O N A L				
352-INT-01	DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETWORK OF THE NEWS AGENCIES POOL OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES Prensa Latina - La Habana, Cuba	50,000	1989	In process
	TOTAL FOR 1 PROJECT:	50,000		
R E G I O N A L				
350-RLA-52	ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICA, Phase I Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA) - Caracas, Venezuela	55,000	1984	Terminated
350-RLA-54	ESTABLISHMENT OF A COORDINATED SYSTEM OF EXCHANGE, Phase I Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena (JUNAC) - Lima, Perú	70,000	1984	Terminated
350-RLA-64	STRENGTHENING OF MASS COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES FOR ANDEAN COUNTRIES, Phase II Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena (JUNAC) - Lima, Perú	100,000	1985	Terminated**

*Excluding three IPDC ones transferred from headquarters after initiation in 1984 and recentralized in 1985, on request from RCA/LA, due to suffering serious problems for which this office could not take responsibility. These projects were 350-VEN-31, 350-COS-31, and 350-RLA-62.

**This project came slightly short of completing all the activities foreseen and thus a small unspent balance was reimbursed to headquarters.

CODE	PROJECT TITLE AND GRANTEE INSTITUTION	AMOUNT US\$	APPROVAL YEAR	STATUS
350-RLA-75	RADIO AND TELEVISION POLICIES IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES: PRELIMINARY STUDY, Phase I Instituto para América Latina (IPAL) - Lima, Perú	30,000	1986	Terminated
350-RLA-84	CREATION AND INITIATION OF THE INFORMATION SERVICE FOR THE EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (SIETCOM), Phase II Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA) - Caracas, Venezuela	20,000	1987	Terminated
350-RLA-86	TELEVISION POLICIES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, Phase II Instituto para América Latina (IPAL) - Lima, Perú	20,000	1987	Terminated
350-RLA-88	INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON WOMEN, COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA Radio Belgrano - Buenos Aires, Argentina	20,000	1987	Terminated
350-RLA-89	MULTINATIONAL RADIO CO-PRODUCTION SERVICE FOR DEVELOPMENT (CORADES) Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores en Comunicación para América Latina (CIESPAL) - Quito, Ecuador	20,000	1987	Terminated
350-RLA-95	PROMOTION OF EXCHANGES AND IMPROVEMENT OF AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Fundación del Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano - La Habana, Cuba	30,000	1988	In process
350-RLA-96	TELEVISION POLICIES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, Phase III Instituto para América Latina (IPAL) - Lima, Perú	25,000	1988	Terminated
352-RLA-01	TRAINING OF COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTORS IN TEACHING METHODOLOGY Federación Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Facultades de Comunicación Social (FELAFACS) - Bogotá, Colombia	70,000	1989	In process

CODE	PROJECT TITLE AND GRANTEE INSTITUTION	AMOUNT US\$	APPROVAL YEAR	STATUS
Unknown	COMPUTERIZED DOCUMENTATION CENTRE OF AIR Asociación Internacional de Radiodifusión (AIR) - Montevideo, Uruguay	48,000	1990	Not launched
TOTAL FOR 12 PROJECTS:		508,000		
N A T I O N A L				
350-GLO-01	CENTRE FOR TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF BOLIVIAN TELEVISION Ministerio de Informaciones - (La Paz, Bolivia)	15,000	1983	Terminated
350-BOL-51	CO-OPERATION MULTI-MEDIA CENTRE, Phase I Educación Radiofónica Boliviana (ERBOL) - La Paz, Bolivia	55,000	1984	Terminated
350-BOL-71	TRAINING IN BROADCASTING (SECRAD), Phase I Universidad Católica Boliviana - La Paz, Bolivia	30,000	1986	Terminated
350-COL-71	ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTION UNIT, Phase I Unidad Universitaria del Sur (UNISUR) - Bogotá, Colombia	35,000	1986	Terminated
350-ECU-71	PROGRAM OF COMMUNICATION FOR DISTANCE TEACHING Ministerio de Educación - (Quito, Ecuador)	45,000	1986	Terminated
350-ELS-71	IMPROVEMENT OF RADIO AND TELEVISION, Phase I Ministerio de Cultura y Comunicaciones - San Salvador, El Salvador	30,000	1986	Terminated
350-PER-71	MULTI-MEDIA TECHNIQUES FOR LITERACY TEACHING Ministerio de Educación - (Lima, Perú)	35,000	1986	Terminated*

*This project came slightly short of completing all the activities foreseen and thus a small unspent balance was reimbursed to headquarters.

CODE	PROJECT TITLE AND GRANTEE INSTITUTION	AMOUNT US\$	APPROVAL YEAR	STATUS
350-ARG-81	SUPPORT TO NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR DEMOCRATIZATION OF CULTURE Presidencia de la República - (Buenos Aires, Argentina)	30,000	1987	Terminated
350-BOL-81	EDUCATIONAL VIDEO CENTRE, Phase II Educación Radiofónica Boliviana (ERBOL) - (La Paz, Bolivia)	25,000	1987	Terminated
350-COL-81	EXTENSION OF THE UNISUR AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTION UNIT, Phase II Unidad Universitaria del Sur (UNISUR) - Bogotá, Colombia	15,000	1987	Terminated
350-ELS-81	IMPROVEMENT OF THE EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, AND CURRENT AFFAIR PROGRAMMES OF THE STATE RADIO AND TV SERVICE, Phase II Ministerio de Cultura y Comunicaciones - San Salvador, El Salvador	30,000	1987	In process
350-BOL-82	TRAINING IN BROADCASTING FOR DEVELOPMENT (SECRAD), Phase II Universidad Católica Boliviana - La Paz, Bolivia	10,000	1987	Terminated
350-COL-82	ESTABLISHMENT OF A MEDIA UNIT IN THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION WITH THE NECESSARY STAFF AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT Ministerio de Educación - Bogotá, Colombia	25,000	1987	Terminated*
350-BOL-83	SUPPORT FOR POPULAR AND EDUCATIONAL RADIO Centro de Integración de Medios de Comunicación Alternativa (CIMCA) - La Paz, Bolivia	30,000	1987	Terminated
350-BRA-91	PROMOTION AND POPULAR PRODUCTION OF VIDEO Associação Brasileira de Video no Movimento Popular - Sao Paulo, Brasil	20,000	1988	In process

*This project came slightly short of completing all the activities foreseen and thus a small unspent balance was reimbursed to headquarters.

CODE	PROJECT TITLE AND GRANTEE INSTITUTION	AMOUNT US\$	APPROVAL YEAR	STATUS
350-COL-91	INFLUENCE OF THE SOCIAL COMMUNICATION MEDIA ON CHILDREN Universidad Industrial de Santander - Bucaramanga, Colombia	20,000	1988	In process
350-PER-91	COMPUTERIZATION OF ANDINA Agencia Peruana de Noticias y Publicidad - Lima, Perú	30,000	1988	Terminated
350-URG-91	DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN STATE TELEVISION Canal 5, SODRE - Montevideo, Uruguay	24,000	1988	In process
350-ECU-92	RECOVERY AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL MOVING IMAGES Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana/Cinemateca Nacional - Quito, Ecuador	30,000	1988	Terminated
Unknown	ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION SYSTEM FOR COMMUNICATION (SINDOC) Unión de Periodistas - La Habana, Cuba	68,000	1990	Not launched
Unknown	BROADCASTING PROGRAMS FOR THE TRANSFER OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGIES Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnología Agrícolas (ICTA) - Guatemala C.A., Guatemala	55,000	1990	Not launched
Unknown	TRAINING PROGRAM IN COMMUNICATION FOR COOPERATIVE INSTRUCTORS Instituto Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo (INFOCOOP) - San José, Costa Rica	40,000	1990	Not launched
TOTAL FOR 22 PROJECTS		697,000		

B. FIT PROJECTS

CODE	PROJECT TITLE AND GRANTEE INSTITUTION	AMOUNT US\$	APPROVAL YEAR	STATUS
N A T I O N A L				
520-ECU-61	PROBLEMS OF PRESERVATION OF MOVING IMAGES, Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, Cinemateca Nacional, Quito-Ecuador	9,000	1989	In process
Unknown	TRAINING IN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION, Universidad Católica, Trabajar y Compartir, Asunción-Paraguay	40,000	1990	Not launched
TOTAL FOR 2 PROJECTS		49,000		
GRAND TOTAL FOR 37 PROJECTS:		1,304,000		

Quito, July 1990

SUMMARY OF PRODUCTS OF EXTRA-BUDGETARY PROJECTS HANDLED BY RCA/LA BETWEEN 1983 AND 1990*

A. IPDC PROJECTS

PROJECT TITLE	PRODUCTS
I N T E R R E G I O N A L	
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETWORK OF THE NEWS AGENCIES POOL OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES (Prensa Latina - La Habana, Cuba)	- Provision of equipment
R E G I O N A L	
ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICA, Phase I (SELA - Caracas, Venezuela)	- 5 studies
ESTABLISHMENT OF A COORDINATED SYSTEM OF EXCHANGE, Phase I (JUNAC - Lima, Perú)	- 60 video programs - 11 studies - 23 bulletins
STRENGTHENING OF MASS COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES FOR ANDEAN COUNTRIES, Phase II (JUNAC - Lima, Perú)	- 20 video programs - 50 bulletins - 1 study - 1 book
RADIO AND TELEVISION POLICIES IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES: PRELIMINARY STUDY, Phase I (IPAL - Lima, Perú)	- 7 studies

*Some projects include more than one phase, but constitute technically a unity. However, in administrative terms--contracts, payments, etc.--each phase is regarded by itself a project. This latter stance has been applied for computations in the present report. Projects of JUNAC, SELA, and IPAL are examples of multi-phased regional projects. And, at the national level, whereas Bolivia, for instance, appears with six projects it actually had only four, two of them (those of ERBOL and SECRAD) having two phases each.

PROJECT TITLE	PRODUCTS
CREATION AND INITIATION OF THE INFORMATION SERVICE FOR THE EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (SIETCOM), Phase II (SELA - Caracas, Venezuela)	- 3 studies
TELEVISION POLICIES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, Phase II (IPAL - Lima, Perú)	- 1 video - 1 study - 1 book - 1 course for 82 men and 63 women - 1 seminar for 53 men and 22 women
INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON WOMEN, COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (Radio Belgrano - Buenos Aires, Argentina)	- 1 meeting for 2 men 58 women
MULTINATIONAL RADIO CO-PRODUCTION SERVICE FOR DEVELOPMENT (CORADES) (CIESPAL - Quito, Ecuador)	- 1 meeting for 16 men and 4 women - 90 scripts for radio programs - 23 audio cassettes containing 90 radio programs
PROMOTION OF EXCHANGES AND IMPROVEMENT OF AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (Fundación del Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano - La Habana, Cuba)*	- Provision of equipment - 1 seminar for 6 men and 4 women - 1 video - 1 methodological design
TELEVISION POLICIES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, Phase III (IPAL - Lima, Perú)	- 2 workshops for 48 men and 21 women - 2 seminars for 22 men and 21 women
TRAINING OF COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTORS IN TEACHING METHODOLOGY (FELAFACS - Bogotá, Colombia)*	- 10 workshops for 223 men and 148 women

*Project unfinished; more products expected.

PROJECT TITLE	PRODUCTS
COMPUTERIZED DOCUMENTATION CENTRE OF AIR (AIR - Montevideo, Uruguay)*	
N A T I O N A L	
CENTRE FOR TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF BOLIVIAN TELEVISION (Ministerio de Informaciones - La Paz, Bolivia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3 workshops for 30 men and 18 women - 1 study - 4 television programs broadcast
CO-OPERATION MULTI-MEDIA CENTRE, Phase I (ERBOL - La Paz, Bolivia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment - 9 workshops for 38 men and 7 women - 2 study tours for 2 men - 2 videos
TRAINING IN BROADCASTING (SECRAD), Phase I (Universidad Católica Boliviana - La Paz, Bolivia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment - 15 workshops for 244 men and 75 women - 1 seminar for 31 men and 9 women - 1 study tour for 1 man - 1 study
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTION UNIT, Phase I (UNISUR - Bogotá, Colombia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment - 2 studies
PROGRAM OF COMMUNICATION FOR DISTANCE TEACHING (Ministerio de Educación - Quito, Ecuador)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 6 courses for 102 men and 14 women - 1 seminar for 33 men and 12 women - 2 advisory reports - 10 studies
IMPROVEMENT OF RADIO AND TELEVISION, Phase I (Ministerio de Cultura y Comunicaciones - San Salvador, El Salvador)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment
*Project not started yet; thus, no products computable now.	

PROJECT TITLE	PRODUCTS
MULTI-MEDIA TECHNIQUES FOR LITERACY TEACHING (Ministerio de Educación - Lima, Perú)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment - 4 methodological designs - 4 seminar-workshops for 43 men and 23 women - 2 teaching manuals - 2 practice manuals - 1 manual containing a set of teaching cards - 20 audio cassettes
SUPPORT TO NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR DEMOCRATIZATION OF CULTURE (Presidencia de la República - Buenos Aires, Argentina)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 6 workshops for 71 men and 70 women - 1 course for 8 men and 17 women - Production and presentation of humoristic materials <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 8 bulletins - 15 television scripts for production of spots - 1 audio-cassette containing 11 radio phrases - 1 VHS video cassette - 1 book
EDUCATIONAL VIDEO CENTRE, Phase II (ERBOL - La Paz, Bolivia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment - 5 workshops for 36 men and 3 women
EXTENSION OF THE UNISUR AUDIO-VISUAL PRODUCTION UNIT, Phase II (UNISUR - Bogotá, Colombia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment
IMPROVEMENT OF THE EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, AND CURRENT AFFAIR PROGRAMMES OF THE STATE RADIO AND TV SERVICE, Phase II (Ministry of Culture and Communications - San Salvador, El Salvador)*	
TRAINING IN BROADCASTING FOR DEVELOPMENT (SECRAD), Phase II (Universidad Católica Boliviana - La Paz, Bolivia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment
*Project not started yet; thus, no products computable now.	

PROJECT TITLE	PRODUCTS
ESTABLISHMENT OF A MEDIA UNIT IN THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION WITH THE NECESSARY STAFF AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT (Ministerio de Educación - Bogotá, Colombia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 workshop for 10 men and 8 women - 4 studies
SUPPORT FOR POPULAR AND EDUCATIONAL RADIO (CIMCA, La Paz, Bolivia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2 courses for 33 men and 21 women - 3 workshops for 47 men and 26 women - 1 seminar for 40 men and 16 women - 2 audio-cassettes - 1 brochure - 1 book
PROMOTION AND POPULAR PRODUCTION OF VIDEO (Associação Brasileira de Vídeo no Movimento Popular - Sao Paulo, Brazil)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2 courses for 22 men and 14 women
INFLUENCE OF THE SOCIAL COMMUNICATION MEDIA ON CHILDREN (Universidad Industrial Santander - Bucaramanga, Colombia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 seminar-workshop for 77 men and 80 women - 6 meetings for 410 men and 659 women - 1 study tour for 1 woman - 1 book
COMPUTERIZATION OF ANDINA (Agencia Peruana de Noticias y Publicidad - Lima, Perú)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment
DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN STATE TELEVISION (Canal 5, SODRE - Montevideo, Uruguay)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment - 2 workshops for 22 men and 2 women
RECOVERY AND SAFEGUARDING OF NATIONAL MOVING IMAGES (Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana/Cinemateca Nacional - Quito, Ecuador)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment - 1 study tour for 1 woman - 126 Ecuadorian films fully recovered - 146 acetate rolls with fragmentary films recovered

*Project unfinished; more products expected.

PROJECT TITLE	PRODUCTS
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION SYSTEM FOR COMMUNICATION (SINDOC) (Unión de Periodistas - La Habana, Cuba)*	
BROADCASTING PROGRAMS FOR THE TRANSFER OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGIES (ICTA - Guatemala C.A., Guatemala)*	
TRAINING PROGRAM IN COMMUNICATION FOR COOPERATIVE INSTRUCTORS (INFOCOOP - San José, Costa Rica)*	

B. FIT PROJECTS

PROJECT TITLE	PRODUCTS
N A T I O N A L	
PROBLEMS OF PRESERVATION OF MOVING IMAGES (Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana/Cinemateca Nacional - Quito, Ecuador)**	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of equipment
TRAINING IN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION, Universidad Católica Nuestra Señora de la Asunción/Trabajar y Compartir - Asunción, Paraguay)*	

*Project not started yet; thus, no products computable now.
 **Project unfinished; more products expected.

A N N E X C

THE PROJECT MONITORING SYSTEM BUILT AT RCA/LA (QUITO, ECUADOR)

A summary description by

LUIS RAMIRO BELTRAN

Regional Adviser in Communication for Latin America

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One out of every two projects approved by the IPDC Council for Latin America (not counting the non-Spanish speaking Caribbean) has been managed by the Office of the Regional Adviser in Communication for Latin America based in Quito, Ecuador. This, however, did not happen from the inception of the IPDC. Prior to 1985 the Quito Office handled only one project amounting to US\$15,000. Since then, instead, large numbers of projects were increasingly decentralized to Quito, starting with seven in 1985 itself, for US\$460,000; these were mostly projects in a slow process of implementation transferred from headquarters. Projects originated with Quito assistance started to be approved in 1986. By 1988 the projects handled by this Regional Office had reached a peak of 25 (for US\$769,000), at least four times more than any other field office.

The System's Origin

Such a fast and large increase in responsibilities was not accompanied with growth in staffing for the Quito Office. Given the restriction imposed by the institutional crisis, this Office has remained until now a one-man operation. To cope with the challenge nevertheless involved in such enlargement of duties, the RCA/LA had to recourse to efficacious but inexpensive monitoring procedures. A system for it was not available centrally in UNESCO until the middle of 1985. Only then a first attempt at building one was made by establishing the bi-monthly Operational Data Sheet. Without much application it came to be substituted in 1987 by the Project Monitoring Information System (PMIS), which requires quarterly inputs and has undergone some adjustments since in its data-gathering instruments. As with the previous central system, the Quito inputs to PMIS were not often properly recorded at headquarters and no annual world-wide consolidations have so far been received here.

The need for monitoring was, meanwhile, so pressing in Quito that this Office had to devise at once locally some system of its own while keeping in mind, of course, central requirements and directives. The Office first quickly built a new project filing system based on the analysis of key and standard project documents and of project-processing procedures. It then started designing its monitoring system in early 1985 and had it running experimentally until August of that year. From then on it operated it on a routine basis although it gradually introduced in it refinements. It was this achievement that

allowed the Office to continuously exert project operations' control internally and readily respond to diverse external demands for information on project status. And it did so manually until late 1988, when--having finally been able to purchase computers and having had a program for monitoring be designed--it converted to electronic operation. At that point the system became operable by using at most four hours per day of a highly-trained and meticulous operator to take care of some 30 projects in a dozen countries.

The system is now fully and normally operative and ready to introduce advantageous improvements. A succinct and non-technical explanation of its operations follows.

Project Processing

An IPDC-supported project comprises a large number of sequential decisions and actions within and outside the organization. This amounts to a somewhat complex process involving diverse actors and several locations, and consisting of the following stages:

1. Submission of proposal to IPDC Council by applicant with UNESCO's assistance.
2. Approval of proposal by the Council and assignment of a grant for implementation.
3. Notification of approval to beneficiary by RCA/LA (immediate, non-official) and headquarters (ulterior, official).
4. Allotment of approved money by headquarters to RCA/LA.
5. Submission of Adjusted Operational Program-Budget by beneficiary to RCA/LA. (Changes are determined by reductions of sums requested.)
6. Contract's signature by beneficiary and RCA/LA.
7. Obligation raising by RCA/LA and sending of it to headquarters along with contract.
8. Request to headquarters from RCA/LA for remittance of allotted amount of money.
9. Crediting of allotment to RCA/LA bank account in Quito.
10. Implementation of operations foreseen in Program-Budget in accordance with a calendar including activities, reports and payments.
11. Reporting on activities, problems and achievements by beneficiary to RCA/LA and remittance of payments agreed by RCA/LA to beneficiary.

12. Termination of project by RCA/LA sending final reports (technical and financial) to headquarters, along with specimens of products.

Project Monitoring

Continuously, closely, and critically surveilling this process is the object of the PROJECT MONITORING SYSTEM an administrative information service devised in Quito. It does so from inception to completion essentially by comparing plans with implementation in factual terms: a few pre-recorded constant words accompanied by a few variable figures expressive in essence of the project's nature and evolution. This is to say that the system's purpose is to gauge goal attainment by comparing aims with performance (intentions with achievements) and often by specifically ascertaining product delivery. Beyond objectively verifying compliance with commitments the information the system collects is instrumental to some extent for impact evaluation purposes but only rarely includes qualitative assessment of projects. Monitoring is of course indispensable for evaluation but it is not by itself a tool for rigorously and reliably measuring "success" or "failure," especially if long-range measures are wanted to verify behavioral changes.

What the System does

In general the system obtains and provides brief (mostly numerical) information on project matters in two directions and with two purposes. One is the Paris-Quito-Paris correspondence traffic relative to submission, approval and funding, on the one hand, and monitoring, "evaluation" and termination, on the other. The other feature is the set of multiple communications between Quito and each of the beneficiaries in the countries along the whole process. Although different from each other these two functions are obviously in tight relationship.

The system specifically performs the following operations:

1. Records for each IPDC project start-up data for control tables: number and title of project, name, address and bank account of beneficiary, and budget code.
2. Collects at the beginning of the process basic documents allowing for surveillance of project implementation and organizes them in four files to facilitate their retrieval: antecedents, financial-legal, beneficiary's reports, and evaluations.
3. Keeps a tight chronology of events by briefly recording each of them along the implementation process. This allows to retrieve up-to-date project status information at any point in time this information is required. It is partly through this procedure that the system makes possible easy and fast control over project's situation and printing of status reports at whichever frequency is desired.

4. Records continually implementation data (taken from correspondence, progress reports and monitoring visits by RCA/LA) into control tables surveilling the flow of events, including the delivery of products and the remittance and reception of payments.
5. Analyzes critically the data recorded in the tables in comparison with objectives, program-budget and calendars of activities and payments.
6. Derives from the analysis, at whichever frequency is deemed desirable, follow-up action indications (including beneficiary's prodding and suggestions for adjusting operations). If the ensuing actions produce the intended behaviors the system gives green light for payment; if not, the system leads to further and more pressing prodding.
7. Facilitates in-depth and in-progress assessments by RCA/LA especially in the case of problem-ridden stagnant projects, as well as product assessment.
8. Provides occasionally but readily special-purpose information like that required for visits to countries in region by DG or IPDC Council Chairman through its ability to instantaneously print project lists by year, title, country, functions, media, etc.
9. Satisfies on time and without much effort special information requirements of a periodical nature, such as the bimestral IPDC Newsletter, the quarterly IPDC "evaluation" (originated with the PMIS) and training chart, and the six-monthly chart on women's participation in UNESCO meetings.
10. Satisfies in a matter of a few days headquarters' request for special monitoring services of a complex and demanding nature, such as the Assessment of all IPDC Projects handled by RCA/LA (Quito) from 1983-1988 submitted to Paris in detail on January 22, 1989, with very short notice.

The Outlook

The Project Monitoring System of RCA/LA is by now a well-established feature of this Office. It now calls for improvement, both to refine the quality of monitoring itself and to become more instrumental to impact evaluation, including the in-depth type. This is likely to involve measures preceding and subsequent to monitoring itself. Namely:

1. Modify the guidelines for PRODOC preparation.

Some questions are hardly answerable in practice; i.e., the relationship to national development policies (often not in existence); the ability to become self-winding for continuity; the expectation for effective local counterpart contributions.

- Could we insert in PRODOCS pre-operations objective parameters and post-operations objective parameters, both for immediate post-facto assessment and medium-long-term re-measurements?
 - Other questions instead are missing; i.e., those seeking to ascertain institutional capacity for project execution. Do they have a tradition qualifying them for the undertaking? Do they have competent staff? Is the project really something the country badly needs? Is the applicant a solid institution or just little more than a stationary? How is self-commitment demonstrated or is the project something that would not come to exist unless supported by external aid?
2. Expand and improve the formulation of contracts and standardize the program-budget presentations.
 3. Establish standard forms for progress and final reports, both for technical reporting and for financial reporting.
 4. Define objective and specific norms for product assessment.

The Quito Office can provide significant contributions to these needed refinements. The final expectation is to program the computer so as to alert us "by itself" about dates for contracts, program-budgets, reports, and payments. We have the experience for it and easy access to competent specialists to assist us in the efforts. In fact, this Office is qualified even to conduct, or to contract and supervise, in-depth evaluations. All it needs to proceed with such improvements is money not available in current budgets.

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Quito, March 15, 1990