Institutional Design and Implicit Incentives in Bolivia's Decentralization Model. Diseño institucional e incentivos implícitos en la descentralización boliviana

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2013-05

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Universidad Católica Boliviana "San Pablo". Escuela de la producción y la competitividad.

Abstract

The second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model and its evolution. Subnational public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the positive external shock (boom) period. Consequently, the subnational fiscal surplus was not a result of internal efficiency but of excess revenues from such transfers. Panel models were estimated to identify and assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model.

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Keywords

Descentralización., Diseño institucional., Decentralization Model.

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